Ronaldo does make enough money… to journalists

Yes, Cristiano Ronaldo is not the most likeable person in the world. And yes, comparing him to Messi, both from a footballing and a personal point of view, is unfair (even if I think Messi may not be the nice guy he is so much portrayed as). And on the pitch he acts as a diva which does little to endear us.

So, when he mentioned he is “sad” after not celebrating the goals against Granada over the weekend, it became only natural not to sympathise with him. The question then became the why: why is he sad? As some immediately wrote, he is young, rich, adored by (some) crowds, he is in his physical prime, he is supposed to be in a nice relationship with a beautiful woman (according to glossy magazines), has a stable personal life, etc. What is causing the sadness?

Is it life at Real? Maybe he does not get along that well with Marcelo anymore. Maybe the different clans in the dressing room are creating rifts amongst the players. There is the chance he was upset for not winning the UEFA award that went to Iniesta (he said no and we have to believe him, he never had any problems in expressing his displeasure with previous such decisions). Then there is the question of money: he wants more.

If so, it begs a different question: can a man who makes so much money actually be sad for not getting even more? Especially in a country with 25% unemployment and with salaries receding? The answer is obvious: of course he can. What others make or not is immaterial. It is true that footballers make outrageous sums, but only a small percentage of them are in that category. The vast majority of professional footballers make little more than the average citizen and at the end of the career they still face a much more prolonged retirement. Besides, if Ronaldo and other superstars make that much money, it is because those people who make so much less do pay to watch them. I would bet that there are families feeling the economic squeeze in Spain who may cut on some food items but who haven’t cancelled their pay-TV subscriptions, especially those involving football.

Besides, one can always be sad. Ronaldo did not force anyone to pay those values to him. They offered him those values. Maybe now he thinks he should be getting even more. If he is denied, why shouldn’t he be sad? The same can be said for the other postulated reasons. If you work with people you don’t get along with, you will be sad, no matter how much you make. If the club secretary called you an asshole to your face and the bosses did nothing, you can also get sad, the salary may help but will not solve the problem.

In the end, the only people who do not seem sad are the journalists. Ronaldo is sad. No matter he preferred not to discuss the subject. No matter it may even be a personal issue (his favourite club mascot died or something like that). No matter nobody outside the club actually knows what is going on. No. Cristiano Ronaldo, the diva, is sad. We can sell that. Let’s rejoice.


Thoughts on Portugal-Spain

In short: an excellent first hour, with plenty of tactical battles and a balanced game, followed by the effect of portuguese tiredness and a better spanish bench in pushing Portugal back. Penalties ended up deciding it on a fine edge and allowed the better team to go through to the final.

Starting situation
I had written that Spain would benefit from using a winger such as Navas, but del Bosque opted to go for Silva on the right and Iniesta on the left, reserving Navas for the supersub effect. As expected, this meant that either Arbeloa would not push forward at all or that Ronaldo would get time on the left. Spain, rather surprisingly for me, went for the second option and Arbeloa appeared frequently on the portuguese half to try the overlap after Silva cut in. The main problem was that with Silva being picked by the central midfielders (usually Meireles), Arbeloa had to face Coentrao alone which was an advantage for the portuguese. On the other hand, Ronaldo’s free rein ended up not being so free as expected due to the excellent match from Pique, who several times ran across to the right to put pressure on the portuguese and cover for Arbeloa. Still, after the first few counters by the portuguese, usually through the left side (for more organised attacks, the right side was usually chosen), Arbeloa started snuffing those out with soft fouls. At a certain moment a less lenient referee might have given him a yellow card for repeated fouling, but he escaped. With these tactics, and with the support of Iniesta to Alba, the portuguese got also stiffled and simply could not get the desired breakthrough and score. Most of the attacks were relying on long diagonal balls from Pepe and Bruno Alves and if the first ones were not bad, Bruno Alves tended to overhit his passes and concede possession too cheaply. Veloso would have been a better option, but he almost never had enough time on the ball for it.
On the spanish side, Xavi’s move more upfield had been restricting his influence for a while, but in this match, with Veloso closely guarding him, he became almost completely anonymous and disappeared from sight. When he was replaced by Pedro, at the beginning I had not realised he was gone because I had hardly seen him throughout the match. In that sense, placing him in that position against a portuguese side that featured an in-form deep lying anchorman was a bad tactical move from del Bosque. on the other hand, it also serves to show how much less of a team Spain become without this great orchestrator of moves. The introduction of Negredo from the start was a surprise but, as Michael Cox argues, he might have been seen as the man who could simultaneously play on the shoulder of the defender, hold up balls and finish plays. Still, in a system which had no width and with strong and fast defenders such as Pepe and Bruno Alves, his influence was limited. In this sense, Llorente would probably have been a better option. It was still a shame not to see him staying to play with Navas and Pedro. There were two or three balls on the box for Fabregas that an accomplished striker would have been able to put away or possibly test the keeper.
The result at half time mostly reflected the capacity of both teams to stiffle each other and a 0-0 scoreline was absolutely logical.

Change of tactics
When Fabregas came in, shortly after restart, the spanish team immediately looked better because Fabregas can operate at faster speeds than Xavi and that gave better decisions and faster actions in front of the defence. Furthermore, as soon as Navas was introduced, Spain immediately restricted Coentrao and were able to keep Arbeloa tighter on Ronaldo. In one stroke, Spain had better offensive and defensive shape. On the left side, when Pedro was introduced he not only did the same to restrict Joao Pereira, but the fact that Nani frequently played more as a wide midfielder than a winger meant that Alba could also push forward and create overlaps. Of course the tactics worked excellently, but the fact that Portugal started to tire played an important role. Much was made of the extra two days the portuguese had, but this usually does not play much of a role and the dynamics of the game can be much more determined. As in the semi-final against Germany two years ago, when the Germans got tired chasing the ball, the portuguese started getting exhausted around the one hour mark. Pressing intensely high up the field is tiring and Spain, even though they had less rest, did not overexert themselves against France and could always rest with the ball. This became more and more evident as the time went on and the tiring limbs of the portuguese even caused some commentators to ask where were the spanish finding their strengths.
The depth of the portuguese in comparison with the spanish one was also evidenced by the reluctance of Bento in substituting players. Even these changed little, with the change in personnel being more significant because of the characteristics of each player rather than from a tactical switch. Oliveira brought more running but less ball challenge (something which Almeida did quite well and probably kept him on the pitch until so late). Custodio more energy and new legs, but less passing ability in comparison with Veloso. Varela could probably have come earlier to challenge Alba and check his runs, but Nani was playing well and there were not so many players to change. With hindsight, maybe he could have been brought on for Almeida (since Ronaldo ended up playing almost as target man and Oliveira became anonymous on the left flank), but the switches were all tactical sound and logical. The main problem was the lack of tactical alternatives for Portugal (Bento used only 15 players in the whole tournament) and the tiredness after the strong pressing in the beginning. One word for Patricio: in the whole tournament he had little to do and was at fault only on the second goal of Bendtner (and only partially) but here he kept concentration and parried brilliantly a short range shot from Iniesta that managed to save Portugal at the time. As I read at a certain point on Facebook, Portugal found out on the semi-finals they had also brought a goalkeeper.

Much has been written about the fact that Ronaldo took the last penalty. This is however common for Ronaldo with Portugal. He may be the best penalty taker, but his record on a club level in penalty shoot-outs is not the best (failed against Chelsea in the Champions League final and against Bayern in the semi-finals). Besides, it is quite common to get your two best penatlty takers as the first and last in the list. One to get them off to a flyer and the other to close the count. The main difference ended up being only some five centimetres. Bruno Alves’ penalty was good but slightly too high. Fabregas’ was only slightly good enough. Had the five centimetres gone the other way, Ronaldo might have won it for Portugal with his last penalty.

Standpoint, part 3


Portugal-Czech Republic
As everybody has been keen to point out, Cristiano Ronaldo has been the outstanding attacking player of the tournament. If he had been criticised for his profligacy against Denmark, he had also, as Raphael Hönigstein wrote, put on a typical team-first display to help control the match. That Portugal had needed a late winner from Varela was a different story. Before that he had shown that, despite his constant histrionics, he can lead also by example on the pitch. Still, it was against Holland and the Czech Republic that he really has set the tournament alight. He ran, dribbled, passed, shot (with either foot and head), hit the post four times and scored three all-important goals. Moreover, his simple presence conditions the defensive set-up of the opposite team and creates space for his teammates. This was clear against the Czech Republic, where other players frequently had opportunities to shoot simply because Ronaldö’s presence cleared the path. Even the fact that he was lurking just outside the box created the space for the movement that culminated in Moutinho’s cross for his header. He has been the determining factor in Portugal’s advance, that much is certain.
Still, he has not been the only one. After the goals conceded all started from the left flank which Ronaldo seldom helps cover, Paulo Bento reshuffled his team somewhat to improve fluidity and increase solidity. Miguel Veloso has been the invisible star of the team, by dropping deep to stick to the opposing attacking midfielders and frequently run to the left to give support to Coentrao. In the first matches, it was Moutinho who would cover that side, but as Zonal Marking demonstrated, in recent matches there has been a switch between Meireles and Moutinho, with the latter now closer to the right side and the former offering the attacking thrust and defensive cover from the left. This was a shrewd move, as Bento realised that Meireles was not in his top form and therefore his attacking instincts could be sacrficed in favour of those from Joao Moutinho and at the same time his work rate could help compensating for Ronaldo staying up the pitch. This strongly stiffled Jiracek and with Gebre Selassie occupied, all czech threat had to come from Pilar, a player that was almost always well dealt with by Joao Pereira (who always had support from Nani and never had to face a 2vs1 situation at the back). In the end, the match could be summarised by the portuguese attacks breaking over and over again against the czech defence, the posts or Petr Cech. Ronaldo’s winning header may have come late, but was totally deserved.

Hailed as the the match of the €uro, this encounter had plenty of political conotations. On the pitch, however, the story would be quite simple: Germany would attack and Greece would defend, with an eye on the counter-attack. Joachim Löw decided on this match to present a very different forward line, with Reus on the right for Müller, Schürrle on the left for Podolski and Klose as striker for Gomez. The emphasis seemed to be more on creativity and technique (as well as movement from the part of Klose) to try to break the tight defence. Since Müller and Podolski are more direct players better suited for counter-attacking, this was a clever move. Still, the greek defence proved difficult to break, something which was not helped by an unusual slugginesh of Schweinsteiger on the ball (due to an ankle injury). Greece would defend inside the box, close out outside shots and hit the ball fast usually for Samaras who would try to impose his strength to Boateng and create openings for Salpingidis. In this phase, Katsouranis showed strong defensive awareness and brilliant passing skills, with his passes to the runners always narrowing avoiding interception. Without any team able to break the deadlock, the breakthrough came from Lahm who, taking advantage of not being closed down (the greek players were more concerned with the midfielders) unleashed a shot from outside the box and changed the match. Even though Greece unexpectedly drew just after half-time, they needed time to regroup at the back, having come back onto the pitch in a more attacking disposition. Khedira took advantage of that and scored what, psychologically, amounted to the coup de grâce for the greeks. From then on, it was a matter of putting in another couple of chances (and Klose drawing closer to Gerd Müller’s all-time scoring record with the Mannschaft) and Greece pretty much conceded defeat when Liberopolous came in for what was his final career match, in order to say goodbye to the fans. Germany progressed and stay as the only team to have won all matches whereas Greek go home knowing they overachieved and that they made their fans proud.

This was in effect the most boring match of the tournament so far. One may blame it on Spain’s style of game, with possession and safety being paramount, but France did not help matters by shrugging their formidable attacking force and ligning up with two right-backs, one nowadays mainly defensive player (Malouda) and almost only Ribery and Benzemea to try to fashion some chances for les Bleus. It was therefore ironic that the two right backs failed to stop Iniesta’s pass to Jordi Alba and the latter’s cut into the box before he layed a perfect cross for Xabi Alonso’s header. Still, the main fault was from Gael Clichy, who should have covered that side but was sucked inside and opened up space on his back
After this, the match could be summarised by a possession glut from Spain, closing spaces when out of possession and keeping the ball when in attack. As Cabaye’s influence grew, some spaces appeared at the back, but these were always well dealt with, especially since most openings came from movements wide by Benzema which left the centre completely devoid of french players, since no midfield runners seemed to be available. The second goal from Alonso was almost the only other notable incident on the match and if it brought the scoreline higher than what Spain deserved, it also punished a fearful french side which could have been one of the most exciting ones in the tournament. Spain go on to try to make history and France go back home only in slightly lower disgrace than after South Africa.

As Zonal Marking noted, England’s best period (the first half hour) coincided with Pirlo’s most quiet one and also with the period when Rooney better harrassed the italian regista. Whether Pirlo’s (and by extension Italy’s) dominance started because of Rooney neglecting this job or whether Rooney simply failed to do it because of Pirlo’s quality is difficult to point out, but it is not hard to imagine it was the former. Rooney is an excellent defender and chases the ball whether, but seems to get tired (as in bored) of this job quickly and prefers to stick to attacking. He has only ever managed to be a more defensive player when playing at Manchester United to give Ronaldo more freedom and it appears that, if he is the top player in the group, he will refuse to do too much of the dirty work. This marked the difference with Pirlo, who always ran after his opponent on the rare occasions he lost the ball.
Although Pirlo’s performance should obviously be lauded, Montolivo was only slightly less influencial. He operated more forward and his short passing frequently found spaces with Cassano and Ballotelli which confounded the english defenders. Still, a wastefulness from the italian players guaranteed that England managed not to concede in 120 minutes of play. As time wore on, England reverted to Hodgson’s revered two banks of four and waited it out, hoping for a long ball forward which could conjure a goal from a moment of brilliance by Rooney. Unfortunately, not having any other quality player next to him to fashion such chances (Wellbeck has promise, but he is no Nani or Valencia), the Man United man felt isolated and slowly faded away. In the end, the question was whether Italy would be able to break the english resistance or whether the penalties would tell the same old story. They did and England go back home. Despite some encouraging signs by some players, this was a performance that should actually not bring too much hope to english fans. Wellbeck only showed some flashes, Ashley Cole was largely anonymous, Wallcott and Oxlade-Chamberlain had impact mainly against tiring and mediocre defenders and the best members at the back were men around 30 years old. The day that strikers will get used to fake a shot to let Terry go to ground before actually shooting, England’s defence may actually crumble. Until 2014, however, the three lions may still be able to limp to Brazil.
Italy will now face Germany, an opponent they have a good history against. Still, with two less days to rest and 30 minutes of play (plus the stress of a penalty shoot-out) extra, they may fall to Germany’s attacking machine. After the possession masterclass by the italians in the quarter-finals, we may well see them going back to basics and shut down at the back in the semi-finals. Still, a side with Pirlo and Ballotelli should never be written off.

Final thoughts
As Sid Lowe wrote, the four best and most interesting sides made it to the semi-finals. Both matches will probably see proactive sides (Spain and Germany) against reactive ones (Portugal and Italy, respectively). Still, with the players on display, it should never be expected that one team will park the bus while the other looks for a way around it. These matches, even with the need to keep solidity in mind, could give some of the most interesting semi-final matches in several years.

Standpoint, part 1

First of all, an apology is in order. Due to professional obligations which have absolutely nothing to do with football or any other sport, I was not able to finalise my preview of all the groups of the Euro nor to post any thoughts on the matches. I will try therefore to offer a small summary of my expectations to the other two groups not covered before (groups B and D) and my impressions of the tournament so far.

Group B

As could be expected by reading the header of this blog, this was the most interesting group on a personal level. I was expecting Germany to prove itself too strong for all opponents, but I had also expected some different things happening throughout the matches. For once, I had imagined Germany as capable of steamrolling Portugal while conceding one goal but instead we were treated to a relatively even match in which Germany’s availability of a world class striker made all the difference. Against Holland, I had expected pretty much the match that took place, but not such a broken game where one team tended to be pinned down at the back for while the other attacked. Versus Denmark, the Danish resilience surprised me, but I would have thought Joachim Löw would have preferred to go with a slightly modified line-up, bringing in more mobile and creative players in any of Klose, Götze, Schürrle or Reus. Also from the point of view of a neutral, it would have made for something considerably more exciting than the football on show.

Holland is usually a complicated team to predict, as we never know the face they will present in the major tournaments. In this one, it was the disjointed and divided one, which is probably the main reason for having departed on zero points after being touted as the “third men” of the competition, after Germany and Spain. Bert van Maarwijk’s tactics could be brought into question, particularly the use of van Bommel instead of van der Vaart or Kevin Strootman, but the simple fact that before the tournament it was the place of Nigel de Jong that was in question should eliminate any 20/20 hindsight reflections. The tactics of two defensive midfielders were sound (as the match against Portugal showed) and if anything, it was the use of Robben instead of Huntelaar (with van Persie, Sneijder and Affellay/Kuyt forming a fluid attacking trio) that unbalanced the team. Playing two destructive players at the base of the midfield was the basis for the almost fully successful run in the world cup in South Africa, so it should not be undermined here.

Denmark was a surprise in the way they managed to confound the opponents so much. Against Holland, they were lucky not to concede, but the interplay between some of the front players was excellent. Against Portugal they pulled back by exploiting the Portuguese weaknesses and against Germany they relied on some strong determination to fight for the match for a long period, even if outclassed. The determining factor was Crohn-Dehli, a dynamo of a player who plays mostly in a striker position for his club but who played here as an inside forward on the left, simultaneously providing attacking threat and also helping the left-back to cope with attackers of the caliber of Robben, Nani and Thomas Müller. All in all, Denmark can be proud of their performance.

Of course that the qualification of Portugal (already in the semis, but I’ll leave that for afterwards) pleased me, but especially because I had not expected them to get so far. I imagined they would lose to Germany, probably scrape a victory against Denmark but then fall short against Holland. This was the defining match, but I had predicted that Holland would have been in a better moment and not as desperate. The weaknesses of Portugal were quite evident from the start: problems with a left flank where Ronaldo does not help much, two left backs extremely vulnerable in balls through the air; and the lack of a quality striker. It was also pointed out that Portugal did not present much creativity, but that was not something I was particularly worried about. Even though neither of the midfield trio is a typical “number 10” type of player, their simple background grants them a larger degree of creativity than that of a comparable English, German or even Dutch counterpart. Without a really creative player, their combined inventiveness would provide the necessary penetration. In this sense, even though he is probably the striker with the worst finalization of all Paulo Bento took with him, Postiga’s movement fits well with the attacking actions of the wingers and he works well to create spaces for midfield and flank runs. His main weakness and one which frequently exasperated Ronaldo is his incapability to deal with balls played in space for him to chase and score. He can however get himself in good striking positions and if the ball is well placed he can score good goals (he has a better ratio of goals/caps for the national team than at any of his clubs). Still, I always expected that balls floated from right or left to behind the centre-backs (as in the goals of Gomez and both of Bendtner) would be Portugal’s undoing. The team however reacted splendidly and with Veloso doing a wonderful and unheralded job of picking the opposition’s attacking midfielder and helping Coentrão in defence, it was possible to offer some measure of balance. Also the substitutions by Bento were spot on, with Varela and Oliveira able to offer energy and dynamism to confront the opposition while the coming in of Rolando clearly hinted at several hours of training ground work with three at the back dealing with balls in the box. In the end, it has been Ronaldo’s performances that have made the difference, even against Denmark where his threat meant someone ended up always free, something which lead to the winning goal of Varela. This dependence may be worrying, but as long as he plays like this, there is nothing wrong in Bento playing to his strengths.